This paper argues that hysteresis helps explain the long-run behavior of unemployment. The natural rate of unemployment is influenced by the path of actual unemployment, and hence by shifts in aggregate demand. I review past evidence for hysteresis effects and present new evidence for 20 developed countries. A central finding is that large increases in the natural rate are associated with disinflations, and large decreases with run-ups in inflation. These facts are consistent with hysteresis theories and inconsistent with theories in which the natural rate is independent of aggregate demand.
I. INTRODUCTION Much of mainstream macroeconomics is based on an
Aaccelerationist@ Phillips curve. It was described by Friedman (1968) in his Presidential Address. A simple form is
Inflation depends on lagged inflation, often interpreted as a proxy for expected inflation. It also depends on the deviation of unemployment from the natural rate or NAIRU, U*. This essay questions this conventional wisdom. I accept equation (1), but not the view that only supply-side factors influence U*. I believe in the concept of hysteresis advocated
by Blanchard and Summers (1986) : the natural rate can be influenced by the path of actual unemployment. If U rises above U*, for example, there exist mechanisms that pull U* upward.
Since aggregate demand influences U, hysteresis means that demand also influences U*.
Hysteresis is central to long-run unemployment movements in many countries. If we want to know why unemployment rose in much of Europe in the 1980s, or why it fell in the U.K. in the 1990s, or why it has remained relatively stable in the United States, we need to understand hysteresis.
This essay addresses two broad issues. The first is whether there is clear evidence of hysteresis effects. To put it differently, can we reject the hypothesis that the NAIRU, and hence the long run behavior of unemployment, is independent of aggregate demand?
The answer to this question is YES! I review past evidence on hysteresis and present some new evidence. My discussion of these topics is speculative. In my view, it=s clear that some form of hysteresis exists, but it=s not clear why. The relationships among unemployment, the natural rate, and inflation appear to be non-linear, but it=s hard to pin down the non-linearities precisely. As a result, policy implications are not crisp.
In sum, hysteresis is an important phenomenon, but one that is not well understood. This means more research is needed. The topic of hysteresis has been neglected in recent years, and that should change. Friedman (1968) This story gets much of its appeal from the fact that it fits two data points, the United States and aggregate Europe.
II. THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND THE CHANGING NAIRU
The U.S. has more flexible labor markets than Europe and has not experienced a rise in the NAIRU. We=ll see, however, that the story works less well when we extend the sample from two economies to twenty.
Departing from most of the literature, this paper will argue that NAIRU changes are caused largely by shifts in aggregate demand. Demand influences actual unemployment, U, which in turn influences the natural rate through hysteresis channels.
What are these channels? When Blanchard and Summers (1986) introduced the idea of hysteresis, they emphasized the Ainsideroutsider@ theory of wage bargaining. When workers become unemployed, the remaining employed workers increase their wage targets, preventing the unemployed from getting their jobs back.
In my view, however, there is little evidence for this kind of hysteresis effect.
There is more evidence for stories in which the long-term unemployed become detached from the labor market. These workers are unattractive to employers, or they don=t try hard to find jobs. These stories fit evidence that hysteresis effects are stronger in countries with long-lived unemployment benefits.
However, as discussed below, we have at best a hazy understanding of hysteresis mechanisms.
Allowing for hysteresis can greatly change our explanations for unemployment movements and our prescriptions for monetary policy. However, I don=t view hysteresis as a radical departure from mainstream economic theory. It is not a rejection of
Friedman=s model, but a generalization of it. We expand the set of factors that cause the U* term in equation (1) however, hysteresis is a big part of the unemployment story.
III. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE OF HYSTERESIS
This paper will confess to major gaps in our understanding of hysteresis, but argue that it clearly exists in some form.
That is, there is strong evidence against the hypothesis that movements in the NAIRU are independent of aggregate demand.
Here I discuss evidence for hysteresis in previous work. I emphasize two papers from some time ago: Ball (1997) 
Disinflations in the 1980s
My 1997 paper examines changes in the NAIRU from 1980 to 1990. It uses estimates of the NAIRU produced by the OECD with a method that is similar in spirit to the Ball-Mankiw method.
According to these estimates, the NAIRU rose over the 1980s in 17 of the 20 countries in the sample. NAIRU changes ranged from -1.4% in the U.S. and Portugal to +9.3% in Ireland.
I argue that NAIRU increases in the 1980s were caused largely by monetary tightenings aimed at reducing inflation.
This conclusion is based on the following evidence: There is a significant relationship across countries between the size of the inflation decrease and the change in the NAIRU. My interpretation is that larger disinflations required larger monetary tightenings, therefore raised unemployment more, therefore raised the NAIRU more through hysteresis.
C The change in the NAIRU is related not only to how much inflation fell, but also to the length of time over which disinflation occurred. Holding constant the total fall in inflation, a quick disinflation raises the NAIRU less than one that is drawn out over time. This result suggests mechanisms for hysteresis, as discussed below.
C While measures of labor-market distortions are generally uncorrelated with NAIRU changes, one of these variables B-the duration of unemployment benefits --interacts significantly with the size and length of disinflation. That is, a given disinflation is associated with a larger rise in the NAIRU if unemployment benefits are available indefinitely. Once we control for this interaction, there is no direct effect of benefit duration. Again, this result is suggestive about hysteresis mechanisms.
Policy Responses to Recessions
My 1999 paper examines the disinflations of the 1980s from another angle. Countries that reduced inflation generally experienced recessions and short-run rises in unemployment.
However, the aftermath of disinflation varied: in some countries unemployment fell again after a few years, while in others the NAIRU rose and unemployment stayed high.
I argue that these differences are largely explained by the conduct of monetary policy. Some central banks tightened policy to reduce inflation, but reversed course when recessions occurred. They eased policy, pushing unemployment back down.
Other central banks tightened policy and kept it tight, so high unemployment persisted. A substantial run-up in inflation also accompanied the NAIRU decreases in Portugal and the Netherlands (although not Ireland).
As in the U.K., central banks did not raise inflation intentionally, but they failed to offset expansionary shocks. In my view, the coincidence of rising inflation with a falling NAIRU suggests that hysteresis is at work, that is, that a demand expansion is driving the NAIRU down. I return to this point
below.
An important nuance is that the inflation run-ups in the U.K. and elsewhere were not permanent. A period of overheating and rising inflation was needed to reduce the NAIRU, but eventually inflation went back down. And when that happened, the NAIRU did not go back up.
IV. SOME NEW EVIDENCE
Here I present new evidence of hysteresis effects. I try to capture these effects in a simple way using data from 1980 In France, for example, the NAIRU increased from 1980, when it was 5.4%, to 1996, when it peaked at 9.4% (see Figure 1 ).
This period qualifies for my set of episodes because the NAIRU rose by more than 3% over the ten years from 1980 to 1990.
For the 20 countries in the sample, there are eight episodes of NAIRU increases that meet my criteria and nine episodes of NAIRU decreases. Table 1 lists the episodes, their dates, and the changes in the NAIRU over the episodes.
For each episode, I examine the behavior of inflation. This seems a natural way to distinguish between conventional stories about NAIRU changes and hysteresis theories. In hysteresis theories, changes in the NAIRU are driven by demand movements that initially push U away from U*. Assuming equation (1) Another possibility is that actual unemployment lags behind changes in the NAIRU. In this case inflation moves in the same direction as the NAIRU, the opposite of the comovement predicted by hysteresis theories. Orphanides (2000) argues that this happened in the United States in the 1970s. The NAIRU rose but policymakers did not recognize the change, so they tried to hold unemployment at the old NAIRU. With U below U*, inflation rose.
In examining inflation behavior, as with unemployment, I
look for large changes. I identify major disinflations, defined as a fall of at least 3% in Atrend inflation.@ Following Ball (1994, 1999) , trend inflation is measured by a nine-quarter centered moving average of inflation. Similarly, I identify major inflation run-ups, defined as increases in trend inflation of at least 3%. I ask whether episodes of large changes in the NAIRU are associated with large disinflations or inflation runups.
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For each of the 17 episodes of major NAIRU changes, Table 2 shows the disinflations and inflation run-ups that occurred within the episode or overlapped with it significantly. The Table gives the dates and sizes of the inflation movements. A given NAIRU-change episode includes from zero to three inflationchange episodes.
What do we learn from Table 2 ? Let=s first examine the episodes of increasing NAIRUs. In six of these eight episodes, there was a significant disinflation, and no inflation run-up.
The other two cases, Sweden and New Zealand, have the pattern of a disinflation followed by an inflation run-up followed by another disinflation. In both of these cases, each of the disinflations is larger than the intervening runup, and the total change in inflation over the three periods is highly negative (-9.2% in Sweden and -14.7% in New Zealand). I interpret these two countries as having disinflationary regimes overall, despite an interruption in disinflation.
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I therefore count all eight episodes of NAIRU increases as involving disinflations. One way to put the result is that a major NAIRU increase is sufficient to tell us that a country experienced a major disinflation:
NAIRU Increase --> Disinflation where the arrow does not indicate causality, but rather sufficiency in the sense that if you find an episode with a NAIRU increase, it is always an episode with a major disinflation. To put the same result a different way, a major disinflation is a necessary condition for a NAIRU increase. there are two inflation run-ups with a large disinflation inbetween. The total inflation change over these episodes is -4.7%.
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Overall, I interpret these five episodes as consistent with hysteresis theories. In each case, the fall in the NAIRU produced a major inflation run-up at some point, suggesting demand expansions. These demand expansions reduced the NAIRU because they were not overwhelmed by much larger disinflations, as in Sweden and New Zealand.
5 A referee suggests that Australia=s inflation run-up was caused by the introduction of a sales tax. However, the tax was introduced in July 2000, and most of the run-up occurred before then. My measure of trend inflation rose from 0.6% in 1998Q1 to 4.2% in 2000Q2. Over the same period, a backward-looking fourquarter average of inflation rose from -0.2% to 3.2%.
The evidence shows, however, that reducing the NAIRU does not require a permanent increase in inflation. This is most clear in Ireland and the U.K., where an inflation run-up was followed by a disinflation of similar magnitude. A successful theory of hysteresis will need to explain this pattern.
Four countries have decreases in the NAIRU with neither inflation run-ups nor disinflations: Finland, Italy, New Zealand, and Spain. Notice that, in all four cases, the episodes of falling NAIRUs followed large NAIRU increases, and only partly reversed these increases. The decreases look like some kind of mean reversion. One interpretation is that hysteresis effects are long-lived but not permanent. Tight monetary policy causes a rise in unemployment that lasts a long time, but eventually unemployment starts falling even if inflation is stable.
Note that four of the NAIRU decreases in Table 1 were not preceded by large NAIRU increases. These four episodes are among the five in which a NAIRU decrease was accompanied by a run-up in inflation. So the data suggest that a rise in inflation is necessary for reducing the NAIRU if mean reversion is not at work. We can summarize the results with NAIRU Decrease --> Previous NAIRU Increase or Inflation Run-up capturing the fact that all NAIRU decreases involve at least one of the factors on the right of the arrow.
We can also look at the inflation run-up / NAIRU relationship from the other direction. Table 3 lists all episodes of inflation run-ups since 1980 B-those included in Table 2 and those not included in Table 2 because they did not coincide with major changes in the NAIRU. The episodes are ranked by the size of the inflation increase.
I want to argue that inflation run-ups are associated with decreases in the NAIRU. That=s not true for all of the run-ups in Table 3 , but I have good excuses for discounting some of these cases. The two with asterisks are the Swedish and New Zealand episodes in which inflation run-ups interrupt regimes that are disinflationary overall. In the two cases with double asterisks, in Japan and Switzerland, a 3% decrease in the NAIRU was impossible because the NAIRU was less than 3% when inflation started to rise.
That leaves nine inflation run-ups, and seven of them occurred during periods of NAIRU decreases. The two that didn=t are the two smallest inflation run-ups on the list B-early runups in Australia and Finland. So, among inflation run-ups that were not sandwiched between big disinflations, and where the NAIRU was not below 3% initially, the seven largest run-ups occurred during episodes of NAIRU decreases. To a first approximation we can say Inflation run-up --> Decrease in NAIRU With some qualifications, an inflation run-up is sufficient for a NAIRU decrease (or a NAIRU decrease is necessary for an inflation run-up).
To summarize, the patterns we see in these data are complex. 
Non-linearities and State-dependence
In explaining the idea of hysteresis to students, I sometimes combine the Phillips curve, equation (1), with
Here, the NAIRU is pulled toward actual unemployment. The parameter μ measures the degree of hysteresis.
Empirically, however, it=s clear that no such linear relationship exists. Changes in U sometimes cause changes in U* and sometimes don=t. It seems to depend on the past history of U* and the length of time that U is pushed away from U*.
Hysteresis also appears asymmetric (e.g. an inflation run-up means it=s very likely U* is falling, while disinflations often occur without U* rising).
As usual, it=s difficult to measure non-linearities precisely. And our hazy understanding of hysteresis mechanisms means theory doesn=t give us much guidance. However, there are promising avenues for research.
In particular, there should be more work examining the timeseries behavior of short-term and long-term unemployment.
Suppose, as suggested by Llaudes= work, that long-term unemployment puts less pressure on inflation than short-term unemployment. Then we can learn about the varying effects of U on U* by examining the evolution of U of different durations.
For example, we can directly check whether NAIRU increases are tied to shifts from short-term to long-term unemployment.
We also might better understand why some countries reduce the NAIRU without significant effects on inflation, while inflation rises in other cases. Perhaps in some countries a demand expansion cuts into long-term unemployment without much effect on short-term unemployment. Elsewhere, a NAIRU decrease involves falling short-term unemployment, either because there is less long-term unemployment initially or because demand expands more rapidly. In this case, the effects on inflation are likely to be larger.
Policy Implications
If hysteresis exists, a broad lesson is that it=s dangerous for central banks to focus policy too heavily on inflation, Yet there is considerable evidence that hysteresis is an important factor in unemployment behavior. And there are clear avenues for research, for example using data on short-term and long-term unemployment. I hope hysteresis becomes a more popular topic in the future.
6 Another factor is that Blanchard and Summers have been poor stewards of their hysteresis idea. Summers has been busy with other things. Blanchard has written extensively about unemployment since 1985, but much of his work explicitly or implicitly denies the existence of hysteresis. For example, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) take it as given that shifts in aggregate demand affect actual unemployment but not Aequilibrium@ unemployment. When even the creator of an idea doesn=t seem to believe it, the idea loses credibility.
APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE NAIRU
To estimate the NAIRU, Ball and Mankiw (2002) first estimate the parameter α in π = π -1 + α(U-U*) + ε
which is equation (1) with an error ε, which we interpret as a short-run supply shock. We estimate α by OLS, treating U* as a constant.
Rearranging equation (3) gives us U* -(1/α)ε = U -(1/α)(π-π -1 )
We construct the right side of this equation from the estimated α and data on unemployment and inflation, giving us the left side.
This expression, U*-(1/α)ε, is the NAIRU minus a term proportional to the supply shock. We smooth this series with the Hodrick-Prescott filter to get NAIRU estimates.
The Ball-Mankiw procedure is internally inconsistent because it estimates a time-varying U*, but assumes a constant U* to estimate α. Here I resolve this inconsistency with an iterative procedure. Once I have a series for U*, I use that series to reestimate equation ( 
